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ABSTRACT:  
With the growing intolerance to failures within systems, the issue of fault diagnosis 
has become ever prevalent.  Information concerning these possible failures can help to 
minimise the disruption to the functionality of the system by allowing quick 
rectification.  Traditional approaches to fault diagnosis within engineering systems 
have focused on sequential testing procedures and real time mechanisms.  Both 
methods have been predominantly limited to single fault causes.  Latest approaches 
also consider the issue of multiple faults in reflection to the characteristics of modern 
day systems designed for high reliability.  In addition, a diagnostic capability is 
required in real time and for changeable system functionality.  This paper focuses on 
two approaches which have been developed to cater for the demands of diagnosis 
within current engineering systems, namely application of the fault tree analysis 
technique and the method of digraphs.  Both use a comparative approach to consider 
differences between actual system behaviour and that expected.  The procedural 
guidelines are discussed for each method, with an experimental aircraft fuel system 
used to test and demonstrate the features of the techniques.  The effectiveness of the 
approaches are compared and their future potential highlighted. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
To maximise the operational functionality of any system or the effectiveness of any 
mission it is imperative that failures are detected as quickly as possible.  The ability to 
diagnose a fault when it occurs is the first step to minimising this failure disruption 
time.  Missions can be altered, systems reconfigured and spares ordered to enable the 
successful use of the resultant operative state. 
Early methods dealing with diagnostic capability focused on identifying faults 
at a specific point in time using a series of testing procedures [1, 2].  A symptom – 
fault relationship is evaluated, where a series of tests are used to filter to the actual 
fault cause.  These approaches have been found to be effective in identifying single 
faults and also work well as an offline evaluation mechanism, i.e. for systems which 
have a period of inactivity where testing can occur at appropriate times without 
disruption.  This allows identification of any faults prior to operation.  However, the 
characteristics associated with modern day systems require real time diagnosis and to 
incorporate both adaptability and identification of multiple faults [3]. With systems 
and missions often involving changing conditions and operational modes, adaptability 
is key to perform diagnosis for the full mission or system life. 
 To accommodate these system characteristics extensions to the early testing 
procedures have been developed [4], in addition such tools as genetic algorithms [5] 
have been implemented, both with limited success.  More recent approaches include 
using failure modes and effects analysis [6, 7], fault tree analysis [8, 9] and a 
combination of both [10].  The successfulness of these methods has been variable as 
the system complexity increases. The method of digraphs has been used for limited 
multiple failures [11] identifying the potential for real-time automated monitoring and 
diagnosis, with improvement needed in the number of faults revealed. 
  With a limitation on the number of effective real time multiple fault diagnostic 
tools currently in the literature, this paper compares the most recent fault tree analysis 
and digraph based approaches.  The differences between [8] and [9] are that the best 
approach laid out in these papers is extended to a larger system and the work 
considers system dynamics using flow pattern recognition.  The approach can still 
obtain multiple failures and checks for consistency.  With regards to reference [11], 
this paper considers process variables not just component failure modes, and also 
process variable effects are considered.  Reference [11] uses a more prognosis based 
approach for identifying weak links whereas this research using the method of back 
tracing.  The evaluation of both methods is based on the application to an aircraft fuel 
rig system.  The methods include the capability to evaluate multiple fault causes from 
a given system deviating state, inclusion of transient effects and analysis of dynamic 
system behaviour is considered, and both are adapted to include a form of consistency 
check for the results obtained.  The work has the added originality of being applied to 
an experimental simulator which aids the validation of the results. 
  The remaining sections of the paper are divided into; section 2 explains each 
of the individual diagnostic methods; section 3 reviews the application fuel system in 
detail; section 4 considers the results obtained from the diagnostic methods when 
applied to the fuel rig for steady state and dynamic conditions; section 5 reviews each 
method, with section 6 reporting the overall conclusions to the research. 
 
2 THE DIAGNOSTIC METHODS 
This paper considers the diagnostic application of the fault tree and digraph methods.  
Details of the fundamentals of each procedure are stated, with the similarities 
involving the comparison of actual and expected system behaviour.  Application of 
these steps to an aircraft fuel system is detailed in section 4. 
2.1 Fault Tree Diagnostic Method 
Fault Tree Analysis has been around as a reliability assessment technique since the 
1970s.  It is concerned with the analysis of failures and provides a diagrammatic 
description of the various causes of a specified system failure in terms of the failure of 
its components [12].  Utilising the method for fault diagnostics involves the following 
steps: 
 
Step 1 – Component and Sensor Identification 
Identify the components contained within the system and the failure modes of 
each.  Identify the sensors contained or needed within the system to be used to 
monitor system behaviour. 
Step 2 - Construct fault trees for observable system deviations 
The behaviour of the system can be monitored by sensors located at specific 
points, i.e. flow meters.  Fault trees are constructed to represent the failure 
modes at these locations, i.e. High Flow.  Non-coherent fault trees are 
constructed that include failure and success states of the components, which 
removes inconsistencies between working and failed components.  An 
example is given in Figure 1 to represent unwanted high flow at a valve (valve 
1, shown in Figure 2).  Using not logic one cause is because the valve has 
failed open, and hence it cannot fail closed. The valve has an inlet pipe and an 
outlet pipe (pipes 1 and 2), in order for flow to occur water must be available 
from the main supply and able to pass through the pipes. The necessary 
success events have been included in the right hand branch. 
Step 3 – Determination of System Status 
Compare the readings indicative of the current system behaviour with those 
that are expected given the mode of operation.  Deviations are representative 
of faults present. 
Step 4 – Diagnostic Fault Tree Construction 
Construct a top event structure from the sensor deviations identified in step 2.  
Combine all readings using an AND gate if there are more than one. Perform a 
standard qualitative analysis to obtain potential causes of failure.   
Step 5 – Consistency Verification 
Check the potential causes of system failure obtained in step 3 against the 
sensors reading true to the operating mode.  Any potential causes of failure 
that could cause these true sensor readings to be false can be removed. 
Step 6 – Fault Cause Ranking 
In the instance of multiple fault cause options importance rankings can be used 
to determine the most likely cause of failure. 
2.2 Digraph Diagnostic Method 
Digraphs [13] can be used within engineering applications to represent the 
interrelationships between the process variables, such as temperature, mass flow and 
pressure.  A diagram is constructed where nodes (or circles) are used to represent the 
process variables and edges (lines) are used to represent the interconnections, i.e. 
positive/negative influences.  Nodes also represent component failure modes, 
whereby a signed edge connecting a failure mode node to a process variable node 
indicates the disturbance which the failure mode can cause. A simple digraph 
representation of a valve system unit (Figure 2) is illustrated in Figure 3. The valve 
unit is comprised from three components; namely, Pipe 1, Pipe 2 and Valve 1. 
The respective valve unit digraph depiction is formed by taking the process 
variable mass flow into consideration. The nodes M1 and M2 represent mass flow at 
Pipes 1 and 2 respectively. The relationship between the two nodes is reflected by the 
three edges. M1 is the independent variable whilst M2 is the dependent variable since 
a directed edge connects M2 to M1. The edge with a gain of +1 is a normal edge since 
this represents the relationship which is usually true. For the valve unit case, this 
symbolises the fact that under normal circumstances mass flow in Pipe 1 has a 
positive effect on mass flow in Pipe 2 (i.e. valve open).  The second and third edges 
are conditional edges since their relationship is only true whenever the condition 
represented by ‘:’ exists. For example, the relationship between the two nodes is 
nullified should Valve 1 be closed (Condition A). It must be noted that only one edge 
is true at any one time.  
  Process variable deviations and disturbances [14, 15] within digraphs are 
expressed as one of five discrete values: +10, +1, 0, -1, -10, representing respectively; 
large high, small high, normal, small low and large low.  An unexpected process 
deviation within a system is represented by ‘highlighting’ the respective node in the 
digraph. Subsequent propagation of the deviation through the system is represented by 
marking all of the nodes which were affected by the initial highlighting. 
  There are two phases to the diagnosis, initially the digraph must be 
constructed for the system under analysis, then this model is used to carry out the fault 
identification.  The steps for digraph construction are: 
 
Step 1 & 2 - System Definition and Unit Classification 
Define system to be analysed and list all component failures.  Separate the 
system into sub-units and identify and classify control loops, if present. 
Step 3 – Digraph Unit Model Development 
Generate digraph models for the sub-units taking into consideration all process 
variable deviations which could have an effect on the variables in the model. 
Also consider the extent of the effect the process variable deviations may have 
on the system with regards to assigning discrete values to the deviations.  
Step 4 – System Digraph Formation 
Form system digraph model by connecting common variables from the sub-
unit models. 
 
Once constructed the system digraph model can be used for finding the fault cause(s) 
by application of steps 5 to 7: 
 
Step 5 - Identify Deviations 
 Compare actual and expected system behaviour. 
Step 6 - Flag Non-deviating Nodes 
 Identify the non-deviating sensor nodes on the digraph. 
Step 7 - Back-trace 
Perform diagnosis from noted transmitter deviations to flagged non-deviated 
nodes or until no further back tracing can be carried out. 
 
3 FUEL SYSTEM 
3.1 System Architecture 
The system used to test the capability of the fault tree and digraph diagnostic methods 
is representative of an aircraft fuel system.  It is an experimental fuel rig, illustrated in 
Figure 4, where water is used instead of aviation fuel.  The purpose of the system is to 
provide an adequate amount of clean fuel at the required pressure to the engines 
during all phases of flight. 
Three tanks (Main, Wing and Collector) form the fuel system which feeds the 
engine.  Each tank has two associated pump trays encompassing a peristaltic pump, a 
pressure relief valve, powered and manual isolation valves and a pressure regulating 
valve.  
The collector tank provides the only feed of fuel to the engine tank which 
occurs via a parallel set up of two pumps.  The main storage of fuel for the collector 
tank is via the main tank.  Two pumps, connected in parallel, pump fuel from the 
main tank to the collector tank. The auxiliary storage tanks of the aircraft fuel system 
are represented by the wing tank. Like the main tank, two parallel pumps transfer fuel 
from the wing tank to the collector tank. A large single tank at the base of the fuel rig 
represents an aircraft engine.  A final pump, the centrifugal refuel pump, transfers fuel 
back into the active supply tanks (comprised of the main, wing and collector) from the 
engine tank (representative of refuelling). Complete drainage of the fuel system is 
conducted through utilising the engine tank drain valve.  Each of the three active 
supply tanks are also connected to the engine tank via a manually operated dump 
valve (to represent the dump situation of a real aircraft system).   
The two main modes of operation are ‘active’ and ‘dormant’.  In the active 
mode fluid is transferred from the collector tank to the ‘engine’ (engine tank).  As the 
collector tank level decreases the transfer of fuel from the wing and main tanks to the 
collector tank commences. The tank pumps are switched on and powered isolation 
valves opened.  In the dormant mode the system is in standby, no transfer of fuel 
occurs between the active supply tanks and the engine. The tank pumps are switched 
off and powered isolation valves shut.  Two further modes which can be considered 
are ‘refuel’ and ‘fuel dumping’. Refuelling involves transferring fluid from the engine 
tank store to the three active supply tanks. During fuel dumping the system is drained 
of all fluid. 
3.2 Component Failure Modes 
There are 43 different component failure modes considered in the analysis, which 
may affect the functionality of the fuel rig system. Table 1 illustrates these failure 
modes  Each component failure mode is allocated a code which contains the relevant 
component identification number. In table 1 these replace ‘***’.  The majority of the 
failure modes (30) are associated with one of six valve categories. The peristaltic 
pumps, located in each tank feed line, have four related failure modes whilst the 
centrifugal pumps, utilised in both the transfer and refuel, have three. Each tank has 
two failure modes; tank ruptured or leaking. There are four possible pipe component 
failures. These relate to ruptures, leakages, and complete or partial blockages of 
individual pipes.  
 
 
3.3 Monitoring System Operational Behaviour 
The fuel system status can be obtained using the information from three types of 
sensors associated within the tanks.  These are level, flow and pressure transmitters.  
Distributed throughout the system are four level transmitters (one in each of the main, 
wing, collector and engine tanks), seven flow transmitters (two for each of the wing, 
main and collector tanks, one for the engine tank), and six pressure transmitters (two 
for each of the main, wing and collector tanks). For diagnostics the level transmitters 
allow categorization of the fuel level into high (above required level), low (below 
pump shut off level), required level (maximum refuelling level), fine section (between 
pump shut off and required refuelling level), pump shut off (level at which 
insufficient fuel for transfer) or empty.  The pressure transmitter readings allow 
classification of high pressure levels, no pressure or partial pressure.  Similarly the 
flow transmitters identify readings of flow, no flow or partial flow.  Table 2 illustrates 
the specific sensors associated with each of the tank sections. 
 
3.4 Fuel System Assumptions 
In modelling the fuel system various assumptions have been made.  A blockage 
whether in a valve or a pipe assumes a complete blockage preventing any flow of fuel.  
Pipe rupture infers that the fuel will flow out of the rupture site and not along its 
intended path.  A partial blockage (in a valve or pipe) refers to a partial stoppage of 
flow.  A leak (in a valve or pipe) will result in some fluid loss yielding partial flow.  
For the analysis steady state operation of the system has been assumed as well as 
reliable sensor readings monitoring the system behaviour (the consideration of 
dynamic behaviour is addressed in sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
4 APPLICATION OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS 
4.1 Actual System Operating Behaviour 
In using both methods deviations are considered from the normal expected operating 
behaviour of the system.  In the active mode it is assumed that there would be flow 
out of the main and wing tanks into the collector tank, where fuel transfers to the 
engine.  The expected sensor readings for the main tank would be that the level 
transmitter (LT0110) would indicate a level greater than the pump shut off (>PSO) 
requirement indicating fuel available for transfer.  The flow transmitter (FT0100) in 
the fuel drain line would indicate no flow.  The flow transmitter (FT0110) which 
monitors flow to the collector tank would register flow, and the pressure transmitters 
(PT0110/0120) would each register pressure (the main tank schematic with sensor 
codes is shown in Figure 5). 
The corresponding sensors on the wing tank would indicate the same 
respective readings.  The readings for the collector tank would also indicate required 
level, no flow to drain, flow to engine and pressure at both pressure transmitters.  The 
expected sensor readings can also be obtained for the other operational modes. 
To illustrate within the paper the diagnostic process, the actual readings from 
all the sensors within the system have been assumed to indicate a deviation within the 
main tank.   
 
The readings for this section are (with the deviated state in bold): 
LT0110:  >Pump Shut Off Level 
FT0100:  No Flow 
FT0110:  No Flow 
PT0110/0120: Pressure 
All other readings conform to expectation. 
 
4.2 Using The Fault Tree Method 
To utilise this method a fault tree is constructed to represent the causes of unexpected 
system behaviour.  The inputs to this diagnostic tree depicting the actual system 
functionality are the fault trees for the necessary sensor failure modes (step 1).  
Considering the main tank, there would be three fault trees for the failure modes of 
the flow transmitter monitoring flow from the main tank to drain (FT0100), 
representing the causes of No Flow, Flow and Partial Flow.  The same three fault tree 
failure modes would be constructed for the flow transmitter monitoring the state of 
flow from the main tank to the collector tank (FT0110).  Each pressure transmitter 
(PT0110 and PT0120) would have three fault trees representing the failure modes 
High Pressure, No pressure, Partial pressure. 
 All fault trees contain failure and success events, therefore use AND, OR and 
NOT logic (referred to as non-coherent fault trees).  The inclusion of the success 
events (or equivalent NOT logic) helps to remove failure causes that are not possible 
when more than one sensor failure mode are combined. 
Given the actual behaviour of the system, deviations from the expected state is 
indicative of a fault or faults within the system.  To establish the faults the causes are 
extracted by combining the individual faults trees constructed in step 1, representing 
the deviated readings, using AND logic.   
From the assumed actual system behaviour (discussed in section 4.1) the 
deviated reading from the normal active behaviour involves the flow from the main 
tank to the collector tank (monitored by FT0110).  The actual reading is No Flow, 
therefore the top event structure for the deviated state will involve just ‘No Flow at 
FT0110’, as shown in Figure 6. 
 No flow at FT0110 is caused by either a failure immediately before the sensor, 
namely in the section of pipe labelled P117, or a failure on both lines 1 and 2 of the 
tank. When considering the failure at P117, it can fail blocked or ruptured.  As the 
fault trees also consider the working states then if the pipe is ruptured it cannot be 
blocked, partially blocked or leaking.  If the pipe is ruptured it cannot be blocked, 
partially blocked or leaking.  Hence the intermediate gate combination will involve 
two intermediate input combinations, one will be the ANDed combination of P117 
blocked with NOT the other failure modes for P117, and the other will be P117 
ruptured with NOT P117s other failure modes ANDed together. 
A failure will occur on line 1 if there is a blockage or a rupture in P102, P104, 
P105, P106, P107, or P108.  If P102 is blocked then it can not be ruptured, partially 
blocked or leaking, similarly if it is ruptured it can not be blocked, partially blocked 
or leaking.  The same analogy can be made for the other five pipes (P104-108). The 
isolation valve, IVP0110, could be blocked, or failed closed, and NOT failed open, 
stuck, partially blocked or leaking.  The back pressure valve, BP0110, could be 
blocked and NOT partially blocked or leaking, or the pump itself (PP0110) could 
have failed shut off and NOT failed mechanically, leaking or failed on. 
Similarly a failure will occur on line 2 if there is a blockage or a rupture in 
P109, P110, P112, P113, P114, P115 or P116. They can not be ruptured, leaking or 
partially blocked if blocked.  If the pipes are ruptured then they can not be blocked, 
partially blocked or leaking.  The IVP0120 valve could be blocked or failed closed 
and NOT failed open, leaking or stuck.  The back pressure valve BP0120 could be 
blocked and NOT partially blocked or leaking, or the pump (PP0120) could be shut 
off and NOT failed mechanically, leaking or failed on.  The tank also could be the 
problem area having ruptured. 
When analysing the fault tree using the standard qualitative procedures prime 
implicants are produced.  These are combinations which include failure and success 
events.  For example, one combination from ‘No flow at FT0110’ is: P102B.P109B.-
P102R.-P102PB.-P102L.-P109R.-P109PB.-P109L where the – symbol means NOT 
that failure event.  This combination involves eight pipe failure modes (referenced as 
P then three numbers corresponding to the pipe section).  The modes of failure for 
these pipes are either blocked (B), partially blocked (PB), leaking (L) or ruptured (R).  
As the purpose of the diagnosis is to yield the failure events, a coherent 
approximation needs to be carried out (basically removing the success states) to yield 
the combinations of failure causes.  Therefore the coherent approximation of the 
example prime implicant would be P102B.P109B.  In total for this given system state 
there are a total of 292 failure causes for having No Flow at FT0110. 
Information can be gained by considering those sensors that are true to the 
operating mode, hence reducing any causes from the list which can not be possible as 
they are functioning to permit non-deviating outcomes.  Performing this consistency 
check results in 83 fault combinations. Two are single component failures, pipe 117 
blocked (P117B) and pipe 117 ruptured (P117R).  The remaining 81 combinations all 
involve the failure of two components together. 
To try and establish the most likely cause of failure importance measures can 
be used.  The Fussell-Vesely probabilistic measure of minimal cut set importance has 
been used in this research.  Each potential failure cause combination (cut set) can be 
given a numerical rating, with the highest rating being deemed the most likely cause 
of failure.  This value is calculated by evaluating the probability of cut set failure 
divided by the diagnostic tree probability of failure.  For this example, the single order 
cut sets rank first and second, with the pipe rupture cause being ranked highest due to 
its higher probability of occurrence. 
 In order to improve the accuracy of the results the dynamics of the system 
need to be taken into account.  The diagnostic process follows the same steps as 
illustrated for the steady state case, although step 2 is modified slightly.  In this step 
comparison of actual and expected behaviour occurs via observation of patterns from 
the sensors over time rather than specific values.  It is only the shape of the sensor 
reading patterns that need to be identified.  Fluctuations or noise is permitted within a 
certain boundary in order to account for small discrepancies in the results.. 
Considering the whole flight phase for certain operating modes has shown that the 
number and complexity of patterns is extremely large to deal with effectively.  In 
order to overcome this, these modes have been split into ‘sub-modes’ that depend 
upon the level in the collector tank.  For instance the ACTIVE operating mode has 
been split into six sub-modes, each indicating expected behaviour of the system for 
the given level in the collector tank. Table 3 shows typical patterns for the three tanks 
with accompanying water levels for one phase of the active mode operation (RL 
refers to required level of water and T1 the level where additional fluid is required 
from the collector tank).  Initially patterns are compared for the individual tank units, 
along with the water level. The tank or tanks identified as inconsistent with the 
expected readings are then examined in more detail.  Here patterns for the sensors 
located in the deviating tank sections are compared.  Step 3 then continues with the 
combination of relevant fault trees for the differing patterns.   
To illustrate by extending the steady state faulty scenario of No Flow at 
FT0110, the outflow from the main tank, with the added knowledge of evidence of a 
constant level in the tank removes invalid fault possibilities.  Deviations would be 
evident in the patterns from the main tank.  From the previous investigation potential 
failure causes included possible ruptures.  However, the information from the level 
sensor contradicts this.  Combining the fault trees for the deviated sensor readings 
within the main tank together with those working successfully yield 37 potential 
failures. 
 
4.3 Using The Digraph Method 
With the system defined and the component failure modes identified, the next phase 
in the procedure involves constructing the unit digraph models for the main, collector 
and wing tanks (step 3).  Part of this process involves the allocation of appropriate 
process variable deviations.  The significance of these are:  
? Signed edges in digraphs are allocated a numeric value so as to indicate a 
more precise relationship.   
? The value is considered in terms of a magnitude with regards to large positive 
or small positive for example. 
? In this manner it aids the diagnostic process in determining more specific 
component failure mode data when back-tracing from known deviating nodes 
(since sensor deviations are classified using similar discrete values e.g. -10 
represents status no flow if expected flow). 
? To enhance the specificity of the relationships between variables (i.e. to 
differentiate between normal flow (usually assigned +/-1), high flow (usually 
assigned -/+10) and partial flow, in addition to the standard  -10, -1, 0, 1, 10, a 
further two discrete values +5 and -5, representing moderate high and 
moderate low, are used.  
Figure 7 details the end portion of the main tank section incorporating two powered 
isolation (IVP0110/ IVP0120) and back pressure valves (BP0110/ BP0120). The flow 
transmitter FT0110 is also noted. Figure 8 illustrates the respective section of the 
main tank digraph. 
The unit digraph for the main tank is developed through a process of 
‘building-up’ from the tank level node, L101. Two near identical branches extend 
from L101. These represent the flow of fluid from the main tank through the 
peristaltic pumps, PP0110 and PP0120. The upper branch encompasses mass flow 
from location 102, referred to as M102, to mass flow at location 108, M108. It 
represents the flow of fluid through line one in the main tank.  
The lower branch depicts flow through line two of the main tank, 
encompassing mass flow from locations 109 to 116. Towards the end of each main 
tank line there is a powered isolation valve (IVP0110, IVP0120) and back pressure 
valve (BP0110, BP0120). If the powered isolation valves are closed by the operator 
then this would invoke a nullification of the relationship between the mass flow nodes 
either side of the valve, as represented by the conditional signing of the arc ‘0: 
IVP110C’ connecting nodes M106 and M107 in Figure 8.  Nodes M108 and M116 
(mass flow at locations 108 and 116) are connected though an ‘AND’ gate since a 
failure would have to occur in both main tank lines if no mass flow were to pass to the 
collector tank through pipes at locations 117 and 118. All mass flow nodes are 
positively dependent on the mass flow at the previous location and hence are 
connected by edges ‘signed’ +1. Mass flow also has a positive effect on the force 
powering the peristaltic pumps. 
The unit model for the main tank is constructed from 242 nodes, 43 process 
variables and 199 component failure modes (140 of these being pipe failures).  A 
similar digraph generation process is conducted for the wing and collector tank 
models.  The three individual units are connected via common nodes to complete the 
construction of the full system digraph model (step 4 of the diagnostic process).  In 
total there are 842 nodes; of which there are 151 process variable nodes and 691 
component failure mode nodes. 
The diagnosis phase involves back-tracing through the system digraph from a 
specific node which represents the location of the given deviation. For cases 
encompassing more than one deviation, the back-tracing procedure then commences 
from all nodes that register a disturbance. The results for the individual deviating 
nodes are ANDed together in order to yield possible failure combinations.  
The retrieved system behaviour for the fuel rig system deviates from the 
known operating mode conditions through the registering of ‘no flow’ at the flow 
transmitter FT0110. The diagnostic results obtained from the digraph are thus 
explained: 
1) Given the flow deviation at FT0110, back-tracing takes into consideration 
failure modes resulting in a large negative disturbance. A large negative 
disturbance correlates with the situation of ‘no flow’ e.g. M117(-10). 
2) From the non-deviating transmitter readings, the following segments of the 
main tank digraph can be flagged: upper and lower branches incorporating the 
pressure transmitters PT0110 and PT0120, shown in figure 5, as well as the 
sections related to the level transmitter LT0110 and flow transmitter FT0100.  
3) From the component failure mode nodes directly related to node M117, two 
failure modes are highlighted as leading to a large negative disturbance in 
mass flow at location 117. These are 117 blocked or ruptured (P117B or 
P117R). Further back-tracing from M117(-10) leads to M116(-10) AND 
M108(-10). 
4) Back-tracing past the ‘AND’ gate on the upper branch reveals failures leading 
to M108(-10). There are three failure modes which could lead to a large 
negative disturbance at node M108; pipe 108 blocked or ruptured (P108B/R) 
and the back pressure valve BP0110 blocked (BP110B). Further failure modes 
are determined through following the fault propagation to nodes M107(-10) 
and M106(-10). Back-tracing ceases at node M106 due to reaching the flagged 
section associated with PT0110. 
5) Back-tracing past the ‘AND’ gate on the lower branch reveals failures leading 
to M116(-10). There are three failure modes which could lead to a large 
negative disturbance at node M116; pipe 116 blocked or ruptured (P116B/R) 
and the back pressure valve BP0120 blocked (BP120B). Further failure modes 
are determined through following the fault propagation to nodes M115(-10) 
and M114(-10). In a similar manner to the procedure described in (4), back-
tracing ceases at node M114 due to reaching the flagged section associated 
with PT0120. 
 
The diagnostic results achieved through the process of back-tracing from the 
registered deviating node in the main tank digraph are illustrated in Table 4.  For the 
given scenario it is possible that either a single fault or multiple fault may have led to 
the registered deviation; the diagnostic results confirm this. In total there are 83 
failure mode options; 2 single order and 81 second order.  Final human intervention, 
with the ability to call on engineering knowledge and experience will target the most 
probable failure modes. The list of failure modes can be further reduced by changing 
the operating mode of the system and comparing the causes for any registered sensor 
deviations noted in the two phases. In the case of multiple deviating sensors, the 
diagnostic results for each sensor are ANDed together to determine the possible 
failure cause(s).   
Taking into consideration dynamic system effects enables a more thorough 
system analysis. The suggested strategy is to analyse system behaviour at frequent 
intervals in order to perform diagnostics and therefore identify if the system has 
shifted from its normal operating mode. This involves monitoring the fuel rig system 
from data retrieved at a set sampling rate and subsequently determining if the system 
is in an abnormal scenario. There are now a number of different expected readings in 
the active mode determined by the level of water in the tank, which ultimately affects 
from which tank fuel may be distributed.  The dynamic effects of faults are 
investigated through examining the tank levels, in particular the rate of change in 
levels.  
Considering the same dynamic example as used for the fault tree method, 
based on the faulty scenario utilised in section 4.1, where it is assumed that the 
deviating transmitter readings remain the same between sampling intervals in addition 
to a recorded static tank level.  The back-tracing procedure is identical to that 
previously described. The rate of change in height of the main tank level is used to 
distinguish between and hone-in on failures that may be the cause for the given 
deviation. The zero rate of change in tank level indicates the occurrence of faults 
incorporating blockages or closures. Conversely, a negative rate of change along with 
‘no flow’ at FT0110 would suggest rupture faults. Taking the rate of level change into 
consideration generates 37 failure combinations; one first order and 36 second order.  
Taking into account dynamic effects for the same faulty scenario allows for a 
reduction in the list of possible failure combinations. When comparing the diagnostic 
results from the previous section with the dynamic results it is noted that the number 
of fault causes listed is more than halved. 
The use of the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance can also be used, like in 
the fault tree approach, to hone-in further on the most probable fault cause from the 
list of possible options produced. 
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Overall Performance of the Methods 
The digraph and the fault tree approaches are noted as displaying a complementary 
perspective. Digraphs display the failure propagation route through a system whereas 
fault trees focus on a certain combination of events which can lead to the top event 
(noted deviation).  
Both methods require diagnostic models (either a fault tree or a digraph) to be 
constructed prior to any analysis.  In addition the similarities extend to requiring the 
difference to be calculated between actual system behaviour and that which is 
expected.  With the large number of sensors throughout the whole system there is the 
potential for thousands of deviations from the expected behaviour.  It has not been 
possible to test both techniques on all possible system state alternatives, however 
consideration of single, two failures and a collection of more than two failures has 
yielded encouraging results.   
    The main discussions on the fault tree method are in section 5.2 and for the 
digraph in section 5.3. 
5.2 Fault Tree Review 
To utilise the fault tree method requires the systematic breakdown of the causes of 
each failure mode for each sensor, in addition the derivation of expected patterns of 
behaviour.  The generation of each of the fault trees is the major task in using this 
method.  As the number of sensors increases the number of fault trees required 
similarly increases. Having generated these trees and patterns the method for 
diagnosis is very straight forward and easy to implement.  This issue of scalability 
could be a factor with more sensors because as the number of deviations increase the 
number of inputs in the diagnostic tree increases.  Within the aircraft fuel system 
application this has not been a limiting factor.  With the modular approach applied 
under dynamic conditions (looking at the patterns at system level then sub-unit level 
then honing in on deviating sections) the issue of scalability is reduced as each stage 
is of a manageable size. 
The results obtained from the analysis of the fuel system have yielded viable 
fault causes, although several options have been produced.  Importance measures 
have provided one means to be able to identify the most likely cause.  The current 
research has not considered faulty sensor readings although a method of using other 
system parameters such as flow rate and rate of change of height have been identified 
as a means to locate unreliable sensors. 
 Direct application of the method discussed in the paper to diagnose faults 
when the system is operating dynamically seems relatively straightforward by the use 
of considering patterns of behaviour over time.  The difficult area is perhaps 
identifying the units for evaluation at each stage of pattern recognition.  For this fuel 
rig example the division has been easily achieved. 
 
5.3  Digraph Review 
Digraphs provide a clear representation of the relationships between the system 
variables due to their close reflection of the physical structure of the system under 
analysis.  To produce the model requires a thorough understanding of the system, 
however it can be developed from detailed engineering drawings.  The full digraph for 
the application system is relatively large; nevertheless development is aided by the 
sub-unit divisions.   
With regards to the fault diagnostics process, the method of back tracing using 
deviating and non-deviating variables, is relatively straightforward and can easily be 
automated within computer code.  Flagging of non deviating sections removes the 
possibility of revealing inconsistent failure modes or anomalies in the fault diagnostic 
results.  The inclusion of +/- 5 within the digraph has provided the ability to include 
partial failures into the analysis. 
The flagging process is easily extended to consider transient effects with 
comparison for specific active mode values depending on the levels of fuel in the 
tank.  Incorporating details of the rate of change in the tank level helps to correctly 
identify fault causes. 
The use of importance measures to determine the most likely fault cause for a 
given deviation helps to hone-in on the most probable fault cause.  Current focus is 
based on investigating a mechanism to further identify the actual cause(s) of any 
registered deviations through consulting data documented by technical personnel in 
maintenance logs.  
The issue of extending the method to more complex systems is plausible, as 
even large models can easily be handled by modern computer systems. The technique 
is also suited to handling control mechanisms and therefore provides the flexibility to 
perform fault diagnostics of complex systems. 
6   CONCLUSIONS 
Both methods have produced realistic results for steady state behaviour.  With no 
difference in predictive potential for this application system the digraph method 
seems the most efficient (as consistency checking is done within the approach) under 
these conditions.  The research for dynamic behaviour has illustrated a modular 
approach can be used during the application of the fault tree approach which means 
that the problem is solved in manageable step sizes, for the digraph method use of 
rates of change are applied to extend the original steady state procedure.  Both 
methods are straightforward to apply once the models are created.   The techniques 
have tackled the characteristics of multiple faults, transient and dynamic behaviour 
and considered consistency check for validation of results.  The importance of sensor 
location to aid diagnosis is an area which may benefit both methods. 
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 Figure 1. Example Non-Coherent Fault Tree 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Valve Example 
  
 
 
Figure 3. Simple Digraph Representation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Fuel Rig Schematic 
 Code Component Failure  Code Component Failure 
TK***L Tank leakage  TK***R Tank rupture 
P***L Pipe leaks  P***B Pipe blocked 
P***R Pipe ruptured  P***PB Pipe partially blocked 
PP***O Peristaltic pump failed on / too high  PP***L Pipe in peristaltic pump leaks 
PP***S Peristaltic pump failed off  PP***M Mechanical failure of peristaltic pump 
CP***O Centrifugal pump failed on  CP***S Centrifugal pump failed off 
PSV***B Pressure relief valve blocked  CP***L Centrifugal pump leaks 
PSV***PB Pressure relief valve partially blocked  PSV***S Pressure relief valve stuck (intermediate) 
PSV***L Pressure relief valve leaks  PSV***O Pressure relief valve opened at incorrect pressure 
IVP***B Powered isolation valve blocked  PSV***C Pressure relief valve closed at incorrect pressure 
IVP***PB Powered isolation valve partially blocked  IVP***S Powered isolation valve stuck (intermediate) 
IVP***L Powered isolation valve leaks  IVP***O Powered isolation valve failed open 
CK***B Check valve blocked  IVP***C Powered isolation valve failed closed 
BP***L Pressure regulating valve leaks  CK***PB Check valve partially blocked 
BP***B Pressure regulating valve blocked  CK***L Check valve leaks 
BBV***B Block bleed valve blocked  BP***PB Pressure regulating valve partially blocked 
BBV***L Block bleed valve leaks  BBV***O Block bleed valve failed open  
TVL***L Reconfiguration valve leaks  BBV***C Block bleed valve failed closed 
IV***O Drain valve failed open  TVL***PB Reconfiguration valve partially blocked 
IV***C Drain valve failed closed  TVL***B Reconfiguration valve blocked 
IV***L Drain valve leaks  IV***PB Drain valve partially blocked 
IV***B Drain valve blocked    
 
Table 1. Fuel Rig System Component Failure Modes 
 
 
Tank 
Section 
Level 
Transmitter Flow Transmitter Pressure Transmitter 
Main LT0110 FT0100 (Drain route) PT0110 (Feed line one) 
 - FT0110 (Tank feed line exit) PT0120 (Feed line two) 
Wing LT0210 FT0200 (Drain route) PT0210 (Feed line one) 
 - FT0210  (Tank feed line exit) PT0220 (Feed line two) 
Collector LT0310 FT0300 (Drain route) PT0310 (Feed line one) 
 - FT0310 (Tank feed line exit) PT0320 (Feed line two) 
Engine LT0410 FT0400 (Refuel line exit) - 
 
Table 2. Fuel Rig System Sensor Locations 
  
 
Figure 5.  Main tank schematic showing sensors and main components   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Fault tree representing No Flow at FT0110 
  MAIN MAIN 
LEVEL 
WING WING 
LEVEL 
COLLECTOR COLLECTOR 
LEVEL 
 FT0110 LT0110 FT0210 LT0210 FT0310 LT0310 
ACTIVE1 
 
   
 
 
Table 3.  Tank Level Dynamic Sensor Patterns 
 
 
RL 
T1 
RLRL 
  
 
 
Figure 7. Section of the Main Tank 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Section of the Main Tank Digraph 
 
 
 
Before ‘AND’ gate P117B/R 
OR 
Upper Branch P108B/R, BP110B, P107B/R, IVP110C, IVP110B, P106B/R 
AND 
Lower Branch P116B/R, BP120B, P115B/R, IVP120C, IVP120B, P114B/R 
 
 
 
Table 4. Faulty Scenario Diagnostic Results 
